

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Among the extraordinary collection of James Joyce manuscripts acquired by the National Library of Ireland in 2002,[1] one of the most fascinating is the notebook used by the author in Paris and Pola in 2003/04.[2] Long believed to have been lost,[3] this jotter, its cover damp-stained and well-worn, was for the aspiring writer something of a pocket *atelier* or ambulant workshop. Filled with a variety of notes, reflections, accounts,[4] booklists, poems and quotations, it affords precious insights into both his daily concerns and artistic interests during that formative period. Until now scholars have referred separately to the "Paris Notebook" and the "Pola Notebook", famous for the earliest formulations of Joyce's literary and aesthetic theories.[5] While the most important contents were known through the transcriptions of Joyce's biographer Herbert Gorman, the original allows us a privileged position as bystander at Joyce's literary workbench.[6]

Of special value is the evidence which the notebook provides for Joyce's study of Aristotle. Particularly revealing are the thirtyone quotations which he wrote into his notebook, and upon which he drew during the decades which followed. Joyce's choice is testimony to what he himself regarded as important in Aristotle; the act of selecting a text and transcribing it in careful longhand into his *cahier* is significant of itself.

Having given up hope of studying medicine in Paris (on learning that fees had to be paid in advance),[7] Joyce turned his attention from physic to metaphysic. Letters of the time indicate his earnest application to the study of Aristotle; in February 1903 he wrote to his brother Stanislaus: "I am feeling very intellectual these times and up to my eyes in Aristotle's Psychology."[8] The following month he wrote to his mother: "I read every day in the Bibliotheque Nationale and every night in the Bibliotheque Sainte Genevieve … I am at present up to my neck

in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and read only him and Ben Jonson."[9] This experience would be recalled in the classroom reminiscences of Stephen Dedalus: "Aristotle's phrase formed itself within the gabbled verses and floated out into the studious silence of the library of Sainte Genevieve where he had read, sheltered from the sin of Paris, night by night" (*U* 2.68-70).

It is beyond the limited scope of this booklet to discuss the very great significance Aristotle had for Joyce. My purpose here is to comment on the phrases copied into his Paris notebook, to elucidate their original context, and assess their assimilation into Joyce's literary works. It will be helpful, however, to provide some brief remarks by way of background. I will refer firstly to Joyce's declared allegiance to Aristotle, and secondly to the Aristotelian consciousness of Stephen, his literary *alter ego*.

Of his extraordinary regard for Aristotle we have Joyce's powerful declaration: "In the last two hundred years we haven't a great thinker. My judgment is bold, since Kant is included. All the great thinkers of recent centuries from Kant to Benedetto Croce have only cultivated the garden. The greatest thinker of all times, in my opinion, is Aristotle. Everything, in his work, is defined with wonderful clarity and simplicity. Later, volumes were written to define the same things."[10] Joyce's younger brother, Stanislaus, noted in his diary: "He upholds Aristotle against his friends, and boasts himself an Aristotelian."[11] In his satirical poem, *The Holy Office*, Joyce appeals to Aristotle in mocking Yeats and other leading figures of the Irish literary revival. He rejects their bogus spirituality and ethereal Celtic mysticism in favour of common sense. In a literal interpretation of the doctrine of catharsis, Joyce wants to cleanse literary Ireland, calling on Aristotle even in the most inauspicious surroundings:

> Myself unto myself will give
> This name, Katharsis-Purgative.
> I, who dishevelled ways forsook
> To hold the poets' grammar-book,
> Bringing to tavern and to brothel
> The mind of witty Aristotle,
> Lest bards in the attempt should err
> Must here be my interpreter:
> Wherefore receive now from my lip
> Peripatetic scholarship.[12]

The mentality of Stephen Dedalus is equally Aristotelian. Aristotle's metaphysics and psychology provide him with the vocabulary and categories needed to understand himself and to interpret the world. In *A Portrait of the Artist*, Joyce's *Künstlerroman*, Stephen seeks to define his identity with help from Aristotle and St. Thomas: "For my purpose I can work on at present by the light of one or two ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas" (*P* 187). In *Ulysses*, Aristotle inspires and guides Stephen's reflections on a series of enigmas presented to his consciousness throughout the course of the day. We are privy to his thoughts on the meaning of history (in the classroom), on the nature of perception and knowledge (on Sandymount strand), and on the nature of the self (in the National Library). Aristotle is for Stephen, as for Dante, the "master of those who know" (*U* 3.6-7: "*maestro di color che sanno*"). He is also honoured with his toponymic, both as the "allwisest Stagyrite" (*U* 15.112) and "that Stagyrite schoolurchin" (U 9.720): a puzzling combination, but at least we may assume Stephen knew that Aristotle was born in the village of Stageira in Northern Greece, and not "on the island of Stagyros", as stated by Don Gifford.[13]

"ALLWISEST STAGYRITE"

Joyce was a sympathetic reader of Aristotle, capturing with remarkable incisiveness and insight, in scant phrase, much of the profundity of the philosopher. While not all of the passages which he copied into his notebook resurface in his work, many recur verbatim, sometimes in the most unlikely locations; for others one can only suspect an oblique allusion, while for a few there appears to be no reference whatsoever. Instead of rigidly adhering to any set of received ideas or principles, Joyce adapted materials to his own mould. Regardless of any putative relevance to his writings, however, the quotations provide a cross-section of Aristotle's system in itself. There is a certain connectedness in the choice; most of them touch upon Aristotle's basic interpretation of the world, the nature of human reality, and the operations of knowledge. Before commenting on each quotation in turn, it will be helpful to sketch a few broad principles of Aristotle's thought which are common to many of the passages which attracted Joyce's interest. At some risk of later repetition in comments on individual quotations, this will serve to clarify in advance their overall context and coherence.

The central philosophical question facing Aristotle was to explain, on the one hand (against Parmenides), how reality could involve change without thereby incurring contradiction; and, on the other hand (against Plato), how it is possible to attain stable knowledge concerning changing realities. According to Parmenides, change was impossible and unintelligible; fixated by the overwhelming logic governing the stark separation between being and non-being, this giant of presocratic philosophy argued that, for something to become other than what it is, requires that it necessarily pass to its only alternative, i.e. into nonbeing. Aristotle's greatest merit was to discern that "being is said in many ways". He recognised the distinction between what things are and what they can be; he formulated for the first time the distinction between actual and potential being. Being in the primary

sense is actuality. Potency only makes sense in relation to actuality, in light of its possible actualisation. Aristotle defines change, or movement, as "the act of the potential as potential"; this can only be effected through the agency of a cause which is itself actual.

Aristotle distinguished between two related meanings of actuality. There is firstly the word "*energeia*" (our word "energy"), meaning "to be active", or literally "at work"; he also coined the term "*entelecheia*" to denote the fully actualised perfection of something having attained its goal or completed its action.[14] In this sense "entelechy" also denotes the actuality of an individual insofar as it is fundamentally determined as a definite kind of substance; another word for this is essence or "form" (Greek *eidos*). Unfortunately our word "form" suggests something external or superficial, "outline", or "shape"; but for Aristotle *eidos* is the most intrinsic principle which determines the very essence of things. It is the basic perfection or actualisation of an individual as itself—its first determination. The most significant instance of form for Aristotle is the soul, which he defines as "the first actuality (*entelechy*) of a natural body endowed with organs" (Quotation 1).[15]

Aristotle makes use of these same concepts in his psychology in order to explain knowledge. In his treatise *On the Soul* (*De Anima*) he defines sensation as the power to receive a sensible form without the matter, as wax takes on the shape of a signet-ring without the gold; it "takes the figure of the gold or bronze but not as bronze or gold". A sense faculty assimilates the sensible form of a single object. Intellect is not so restricted, since it can receive immaterially the forms of all things. It may thus be described as the "form of forms".[16] It has unrestricted cognitive openness towards the entirety of reality, with the capacity to grasp intellectively the essence or form of every

substance which it encounters. This is stated in Joyce's Quotation 15, from *De Anima*: "Summing up what we have said about the soul, let us assert once more that the soul is in a sense all that is."[17]

Herbert Gorman gives the following account of Joyce's evening routine in the early months of 1903: "After his meagre dinner he would saunter across the Boulevard Saint-Michel to the Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève and forget his loneliness in a perusal of Victor Cousin's translation of Aristotle."[18] Ellmann simply repeats Joyce's dependence on Cousin's translations;[19] Jacques Aubert's detailed research,[20] however, has revealed that for the most part Joyce relied upon the translations of J. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire. Victor Cousin, a Plato specialist, translated only Books 1 and 12 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; these were also used by Joyce—to a greater extent than was recognised by Aubert.[21]

The quotations fall into two groups: the first are taken from what may loosely be described as Aristotle's psychological treatises, the second from his *Metaphysics*.[22] Of the first group, fifteen are from the strictly psychological work, *On the Soul* (*De Anima*), which Joyce read in Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire's translation, entitled *Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme*. The remaining three are drawn from *Psychologie d'Aristote. Opuscules (Parva Naturalia)*, a collection of lesser philosophical writings traditionally appended to *De Anima*.[23] The title *Psychologie d'Aristote* is somewhat misleading, and probably explains why Joyce was drawn to it in the first place. He soon lost interest in the second volume, having quoted only from the first two of the nine treatises. There was a time gap between the quotations on psychology and metaphysics. The eighteen quotations from the volumes *Psychologie d'Aristote* appear on pages 3 and 4; the remaining thirteen, from *Métaphysique d'Aristote*, are to be found on page 12 of the notebook.[24]

In the following presentation of Joyce's quotations from Aristotle, numbers have been introduced to facilitate identification and reference. They follow the order in which the texts appear in Joyce's notebook. Where it has seemed helpful I have included some extra lines from the French text in order to illustrate Joyce's selective use of his sources. To present the wider context of Aristotle's thought, and to allow comparison between the ancient philosopher and the aspiring author, I have quoted in English as much of the surrounding text as seemed useful. To facilitate the reader who wishes to make the ultimate comparison, I include also the Greek text, more or less extensively as appeared helpful. (Joyce himself knew no Greek at the time; he later acquired an amateur's knowledge of ancient Greek, and made serious efforts, with some success, to learn modern Greek.)

Quotation 1. "The soul is the first entelechy of a naturally organic body."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme (J. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire),[25] p. 165: "Si donc on veut quelque définition commune à toute espèce d'âme, il faut dire que l'âme est l'entéléchie première d'un corps naturel organique."

On the Soul 2, 1, 412b4-6: "If then it is necessary to give a definition common to all souls, it will be that it is the first actuality (entelechy) of a naturally organic body."

De Anima II, I, 412b4-6: εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ.[26]

Aristotle ingeniously appeals to the primacy of actuality in order to formulate his definition of soul as the most fundamental determining principle of the living body. The body will act, and actualise itself through its various organs;

but in order to do so, these must be first determined and coordinated as the organs of this particular body. Before it can do anything whatsoever, the body must itself be actualised as such. The soul fashions the body with all its components into an individual and is therefore its basic, most rudimentary, determination. Soul is for Aristotle the most significant instance of form; it is the soul which first moulds the body into a unitary, self-subsistent, living being. The body's activities are a second actualisation, but without the first actualisation by soul there is no thinking or perception, movement or rest, reproduction or nutrition, growth or decay. "It is the soul by which we primarily live, perceive, and think; so that soul is the *logos* or form, and not the matter."[27] *Psyche* distinguishes living from nonliving: a cadaver is not a body but only the remains, an aggregate of disparate chemicals. "A corpse has the same shape and fashion as a living body; and yet it is not a man."[28]

In "Scylla and Charybdis" Stephen ponders his own self-identity, when he recalls the pound borrowed by Eglinton. With the passage of time does the lender still exist? Put crassly, have not all his molecules changed? More subtly: is he still the same one, despite his discrete memories? The dilemma is solved by appeal to Aristotle; Stephen remains constant and identical by virtue of his personal entelechy—enduring under the everchanging forms of memory, because the soul is the primordial "form of forms": "But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under everchanging forms" (*U* 9.208-9). In one of his metaphysical insights in Nighttown, Stephen brilliantly describes first entelechy, the soul, as "the structural rhythm".[29] With this principle, Aristotle could respond to the *panta rhei* of Heraclitus ("all is flux"); one could step twice into the same stream, indeed step out of it, as the stream itself flows on: "human nature was a constant quantity", we read in *Stephen Hero* (*SH* 175).

Quotation 2. "The most natural act for living beings which are complete is to produce other beings like themselves and thereby to participate as far as they may in the eternal and divine."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme, p. 187f: "L'acte le plus naturel aux êtres vivants qui sont complets, et qui ne sont ni avortés ni produits par génération spontanée,1 c'est de produire un autre être pareil à eux, l'animal un animal, la plante une plante, afin de participer de l'éternel et du divin autant qu'ils le peuvent."

***On the Soul*, 2, 4, 415a22-415b1:** "It follows that first of all we must treat of nutrition and reproduction, for the nutritive soul is found along with all the others and is the most primitive and widely distributed power of soul, being indeed that one in virtue of which all are said to have life. The acts in which it manifests itself are reproduction and the use of food, because for any living thing that has reached its normal development and which is unmutilated, and whose mode of generation is not spontaneous, the most natural act is the production of another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine."[30]

De Anima II, iv, 415a25-415b1: ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι· φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον 1αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύναται.

Aristotle examines the powers which are common to all living beings, plants, animals and men; nutrition is a basic need for survival, and reproduction is a

fundamental impulse in all living things. For Joyce this passage conveys not only an important truth, but reflects also a deep personal conviction, for which we have ample testimony. His brother Stanislaus recalled: "In spite of his struggle with poverty, he believed in fatherhood and considered it a form of cowardice, 'too great a fear of fate', not to have children."[31] Joyce remarked to Louis Gillet: "I can't understand households without children. I see some with dogs, gimcracks. Why are they alive? To leave nothing behind, not to survive yourself—how sad!"[32] To his sister Eva he declared: "The most important thing that can happen to a man is the birth of a child."[33]

Writing to Frank Budgen about the composition of "Oxen of the Sun", Joyce referred to "the crime committed against fecundity by sterilizing the act of coition."[34] Theodore Purefoy refers in "Circe" to "a mechanical device to frustrate the sacred ends of nature" (*U* 15.1740-1). It would appear, however, that Joyce's concern went beyond the frustration of the coital act: he despised also those who did not engage in that act. Mary Lowe-Evans comments: "A close examination of the episode reveals that the crime is impossibly complex, and in fact surfaces in a myriad of forms. Contraceptive devices, abortion, onanism, and permanent celibacy are the obvious subjects of discussion in the anteroom of the Holles Street Maternity Hospital."[35] An example of the celibate is Bob Doran in Joyce's story "The Boarding House". He is endowed, as Lowe-Evans notes, with "good qualifications for marriage—a steady job, a savings account, and a depleted supply of wild oats."[36] Selfishness, however, restrains him: "His instinct urged him to remain free, not to marry. Once you are married you are done for, it said… The instinct of the celibate warned him to hold back."[37] Hélène Cixous speaks of "Joyce's satire against bachelors", notably Robert Hand (*Exiles*), Blazes Boylan, and Buck Mulligan. She refers to "a small group of men for whom Joyce feels the profoundest antipathy; he takes pleasure

in plotting their downfall… These men, who share between them all the faults Joyce detests, are bachelors… [T]he typical portrait which emerges from a comparison and study of these men shows that Joyce associates the defensive egoism of the man who wants to enjoy life without paying the price with a complete lack of humanity, which is manifest in all their behaviour: they are brutal, their intelligence is without warmth or scruples, they are athletic and proud of their physical and fleshly accomplishments."[38] Such characters, depicted by Joyce, clearly do not measure up to Aristotle's model of the naturally complete individual.

Quotation 3: "A voice is a sound which expresses something."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme, 226: "La voix, en effet, est un son exprimant quelque chose."

***On the Soul* 2, 8, 420b29-33**: "Not every sound, as we said, made by an animal is voice (even with the tongue we may merely make a sound which is not voice, or without the tongue as in coughing); what produces the impact must have soul in it and must be accompanied by an act of imagination, for voice is a sound with a meaning, and is not the result of any impact of the breath as in coughing."[39]

De anima II, viii, 420b32-33: σημαντικὸς γὰρ δή τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή.

Joyce's interest in the voice was well noted. To say that music and song were integral to his art is an understatement. Music was for Joyce a manner of being and living, of knowing the world, and re-enacting it in his writing; in this, song was paramount. He read in Aristotle's *Politics* (part of which was included

in a compilation which he reviewed)[40] the words of Musaeus, the Orphic poet: "Sweetest to mortals is song." He would later write: "The human voice, two tiny silky chords. Wonderful, more than all the others" (*U* 11.791-2).

Quotation 4: "In the sense of touch man is far above all other animals and hence he is the most intelligent animal."

Quotation 5: "Men who have tough flesh have not much intelligence."

Both of these quotations are from the same paragraph, which is here reproduced in full. Since Quotation 6 also refers to the faculty of touch and the role of flesh, they may be commented on together.

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme, 228f: «Pour les autres, il est fort au-dessous de bien des animaux; mais pour le toucher, il est fort au-dessus d'eux tous, ce qui fait aussi qu'il est le plus intelligent des animaux. La preuve, c'est que, même parmi les hommes, les uns sont naturellement bien doués pour ce sens, et que les autres le sont mal, tandis qu'il n'y a rien de pareil pour les espèces inférieures: et ainsi les hommes qui ont la chair dure sont mal doués pour l'intelligence; ceux qui ont la chair douce sont au contraire bien doués.»

***On the Soul* 2, 9, 421a16-26**: "It seems that there is an analogy between smell and taste, and that the species of tastes correspond to those of smells, but that we have a more accurate sense of taste, because it is itself a kind of touch, and man has this sense most accurately. In the other senses he is at a loss compared to many kinds of animals, but **in the sense of touch he is by far much more accurate and discriminating. That is why he is the most intelligent of animals.** Proof of this is that in the human race, individuals

are well or poorly endowed by nature in proportion to their sense of touch, and none other. **Men who have tough flesh are ill endowed with intellect, men of soft flesh are well endowed.**"[41]

De Anima II, ix, 421a16-26: ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχομεν τὴν γεῦσιν διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἁφήν τινα, ταύτην δ᾽ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀκριβεστάτην· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις λείπεται πολλῶν τῶν ζῴων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν πολλῷ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῖ. διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζῴων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς, παρ᾽ ἄλλο δὲ μηδέν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς.

Quotation 6: "The flesh is the intermediary for the sense of touch."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme, 245: On en peut conclure que c'est la chair qui est l'intermédiaire pour l'organe qui touche.

On the Soul 2, 11, 423b26: "Flesh is the medium for the sense of touch."[42]

De Anima II, xi, 423b26: ὥστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ.[43]

One may only speculate regarding the reasons for Joyce's interest in these passages on touch, and the role of flesh in sensation. There is perhaps a hint in his account of Stephen's self-mortification in *Portrait*: "Each of the senses was brought under a rigorous discipline … But it was to the mortification of touch that he brought the most assiduous ingenuity of inventiveness"

(*P* 150-151). In "Lestrygonians" Bloom reflects on the blind stripling's heightened sense of touch, which compensates for his lack of sight (*U* 8.1128-9). We later read of Bloom's sensory equilibrium as he shaves: "Why did absence of light disturb him less than presence of noise? Because of the surety of the sense of touch in his firm full masculine feminine passive active hand" (*U* 17.289).

Aristotle brilliantly theorises that there is a correspondence between the basic tactile sensations of hot, cold, wet, and dry, and the four primitive elements of which everything in the universe is composed: fire, earth, water and air. Sensation may be regarded, therefore, as the root for the knowledge of all things. Aquinas explains why Aristotle regards touch as the basis for all the other senses: "For it is clear that the organ of touch is spread throughout the whole body, that each instrument of sense is also an instrument of touch, and that something is called sensory as a result of the sense of touch. Thus it follows from something's having a better sense of touch that it unconditionally has a better sensory nature and consequently a better intellect. For having a good sense disposes one for having a good intellect."[44]

The suggestion that individuals with hard skin are of lesser intelligence seems preposterous. Aristotle's elitist views on free men and slaves are perhaps at work here. By nature, some are destined for a life of toil and labour in the service of those citizens who are privileged through free birth to pursue loftier ideals. It was of course empirically evident that slaves had calloused hands and weathered skin—perhaps the basis for Aristotle's conclusion. Aquinas finds philosophical clarification of Aristotle's position by suggesting that a refined sense of touch results from a good constitution or harmony among the elements. He concludes: "Now the soul's lofty stature

results from the body's good constitution, because every form is proportioned to its matter. It follows then, that those who have a good sense of touch have a loftier soul and an acuter mind."[45]

Quotation 7: "A sense receives the form without the matter."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme, 247: "Il faut admettre, pour tous les sens en génerale, que le sens est ce qui reçoit les formes sensibles sans la matière, comme la cire reçoit l'empreinte de l'anneau sans le fer ou l'or dont l'anneau est composé, et garde cette empreinte d'airain ou d'or, mais non pas en tant qu'or ou airain."

On the Soul 2, 12, 424a17-21: "In general we must assume of every sense, that a sense is that which receives sensible forms without the matter, as the wax takes on the impression of the signet-ring without the iron or gold, and receives the impression of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or bronze."

De Anima II, xii, 424a17-21: καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός.

Aristotle's simile of wax receiving the impression of the signet-ring to illustrate the abstractive nature of sensation is strengthened by its clear imagery. (See explanation above, p. 5). Is it possible that Joyce took the famous phrase from "Sirens", "bronze by gold" from Aristotle's psychology?[46]

Bloom muses on the experience of the blind stripling in "Lestrygonians": "And with a woman, for instance. More shameless not seeing. That girl passing the Stewart institution, head in the air. Look at me. I have them all on. Must be strange not to see her. Kind of a form in his mind's eye" (*U* 8.1125-7).

Quotation 8: "The sensation of particular things is always true."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme, 278: «La sensation des choses particulières est toujours vraie, même dans tous les animaux; mais on peut faire aussi un usage erroné de la pensée, et cette faculté n'appartient à aucun être qui n'ait en même temps la raison.»[47]

On the Soul 3, 3, 427b11-14: "For the perception of the proper objects is always true, and this is found in all animals; it is possible to think erroneously, however, but this occurs only in beings which have reason."

De Anima III, iii, 427b11-14: ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, διανοεῖσθαι δ' ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῶς, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος.

Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire mistranslates the text, thereby missing the entire point of Aristotle's distinction. "*Aisthesis ton idion*" does not refer to the perception of particular things, but to the sensation of the special or proper objects of each particular sense faculty: sound is grasped only by the ear, colour only by the eye. For Aristotle, it is by nature impossible for the eye to err with regard to the colour of which it has a sensation; the perceiver, however, is open to err in his interpretation of what he perceives. Error in the perception of particular things is most definitely possible; Joyce's quotation misrepresents Aristotle in this regard.

Despite the inaccuracy of this quotation, Joyce nevertheless captures the kernel of Aristotle's theory of sensation, expressing it admirably with two of the most famous phrases from the entire work: "ineluctable modality of the visible" (U3.1) and "ineluctable modality of the audible" (U3.13). These phrases from the start of "Proteus" (a farrago of philosophic reflection drawing on Aristotle, Boehme, Berkeley and Weininger), summarise with accurate clarity Aristotle's fundamental teaching regarding the infallibility of sense knowledge. (The first paragraph of the episode contains a number of references to Aristotle and deserves special attention).

While it is possible that scholars may yet discover that Joyce borrowed the phrase "ineluctable modality", I am inclined to believe it to be his own coinage. Robert McAlmon spotted in Joyce what he himself recognised as the professional malady of young writers, from which Joyce never recovered, namely a penchant towards particular words. McAlmon cites the words "ineluctable" and "metempsychosis"—"grey, clear, abstract, fine-sounding words that are a bit 'ineluctable' themselves".[48] The French word "*modalité*" is, I suggest, another such "fine-sounding" word which strikes the anglophone visitor as lending extraordinary elegance even to everyday parlance. It is unnecessary to seek Joyce's penchant for the word in the Kantian transcendental deduction of the categories!

According to Aristotle, each of the senses has its own "ineluctable modality"; it is infallible within its particular, very restricted, domain. The eye perceives colour, the ear perceives sound; in the simple apprehension of their respective objects they cannot err. This follows by definition from the very nature of the sense faculty itself: the eye is the organ equipped exclusively to grasp colour; the ear is the faculty which necessarily and inevitably grasps sound. "Ineluctable"

is Joyce's choice word for the necessity and inevitability of sense knowledge. Aristotle makes the important distinction between the proper and the common objects of perception; colour is the proper sensible of the eye, sound the proper sensible of the ear. Size, shape, speed and distance, on the other hand, are among what he calls the "common perceptibles", which may be grasped by more than one sense faculty. The perceiver is liable to err if he judges the object on the evidence of only one of the senses.

For Aristotle sensation thus provides a secure foundation for knowledge. The phrase "thought through my eyes" confirms the Aristotelian doctrine that the intellect is itself barren and void of content; it must be activated by the senses, from which it receives its material. This reflection on sensation and thought is repeated later in the work, where Stephen reflects upon the difficulty of seeing correctly with defective eyes: "Distance. The eye sees all flat. Brain thinks. Near: far. Ineluctable modality of the visible" (*U* 15.3630-1). The eye necessarily perceives according as it is equipped; erroneous impressions are corrected by the judgments of intellect. We find this reflection also in "Scylla and Charybdis", in the debate between Platonism and Aristotelianism: "God: noise in the street: very peripatetic. Space: what you damn well have to see" (*U* 9.85-6).

Quotation 9: "That which acts is superior to that which suffers."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme, 303. See Quotation 10.

On the Soul 3, 5, 430a18-19. See Quotation 10.

De Anima III, v, 430a18-19. See Quotation 10.

This refers to the distinction between cause and effect. The cause is superior to the effect; the cause is actual, the effect takes place in the subject undergoing change, which has the potency for that determination, but does not possess it in actuality. What is potential can be brought to actuality only through the action of a cause which is actual. That which acts must be actual; potency is acted upon.

There is no clear allusion to this passage in Joyce. In "Scylla and Charybdis" we read: "The boy of act one is the mature man of act five. All in all. In *Cymbeline*, in *Othello* he is bawd and cuckold. He acts and is acted on" (*U* 9.1021-2).

Quotation 10: " Only when it is separate from all things is the intellect really itself and this intellect separate from all things is immortal and divine."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme 303f.: «Telle est, en effet, l'intelligence, qui, d'une part, peut devenir toutes choses, et qui, d'autre part, peut tout faire. C'est en quelque sorte une virtualité pareille à la lumière; car la lumière, en un certain sens, fait, des couleurs qui ne sont qu'en puissance, des couleurs en réalité. Et telle est l'intelligence qui est séparée, impassible, sans mélange avec quoi que ce soit, et qui par son essence est en acte. **C'est que toujours ce qui agit est supérieur à ce qui souffre l'action, et que le principe est supérieur à la matière.** La science en acte se confond avec l'objet auquel elle s'applique. Mais la science en puissance est pour l'individu seul antérieure dans le temps. Absolument parlant, elle n'est point antérieure dans le temps. Mais ce n'est point lorsque tantôt elle pense et tantôt ne pense pas, **c'est seulement quand elle est séparée que l'intelligence seule est immortelle et éternelle**.»

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On the Soul 3, 5, 430a14-23: "Intellect as described is such because it becomes all things; but there is another kind of intellect, which is what it is because it makes all things: this is a kind of positive state like light, for in a certain manner light makes potential colours into actual colours. Intellect in this sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is essentially an activity; **for the agent [that which acts] is always superior to the patient [that which undergoes action]**, and the originating cause to the matter. Actual knowledge is identical with its object. … The intellect does not sometimes think and sometimes not think. **Only when separated is it what it really is itself, and this alone is immortal and eternal.**"[49]

De Anima III, v, 430a14-23: καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγὴς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ. **ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης**· τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ... ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ νοεῖ. **χωρισθεὶς δ᾽ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον.**

Quotations 9 and 10 are both from the same paragraph of *De Anima* III, which presents two of Aristotle's most important doctrines on soul and intellect. He makes use again of the theory of act and potency to distinguish between the active and passive functions of the intellect. Potentially the intellect can know all things; in that sense it passively *becomes* all things (Quotation 15); however, this knowledge must be first made actual, and this is the function of the active or agent intellect. Aristotle compares its function to that of light, which brings to actuality colours which would otherwise remain potential or latent. It is in

this connection that Aristotle declares that the agent is superior to that which undergoes the action. (Joyce's quotation truncates the meaning of the passage, by leaving out the word "*l'action*" after "*souffre*").

Aristotle's suggestion of the "separated intellect" is among the most acutely disputed topics in the history of Aristotelian philosophy. It was interpreted by the Arabic philosopher Averroes (1126-1198) to mean that there was only a single intellect, separate from individuals but common to all mankind, which makes it possible for humans to think. Aquinas, on the other hand, found in these words of Aristotle a proof for the immortality of the individual soul. In *Ulysses* we read the following reflection on the immortality of the soul: "They tell me on the best authority it is a simple substance and therefore incorruptible. It would be immortal, I understand, but for the possibility of its annihilation by its First Cause, Who, from all I can hear, is quite capable of adding that to the number of His other practical jokes, *corruptio per se* and *corruptio per accidens* both being excluded by court etiquette" (*U* 16.756-760).

Quotation 11: "Error is not found apart from combination."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme 307: «C'est que l'erreur, ici non plus, ne se trouve jamais que dans la combinaison.»

On the Soul 3, 6, 430b1-2: "Error is always found in a combination".

De anima 3, 6, 430b1-2: τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί.

As already explained (Quotation 8), Aristotle maintains that the senses do not err in their grasp of their proper object; nor does the intellect err in its intuition of some intelligible aspect of the object. Error occurs only at the level of judgment, when intellect combines diverse data, and mentally forms the

wrong combination. Whereas sensations of particular sense qualities are always infallible, combinations are open to error if judgment is made too hastily.

Quotation 12: "The principle which hates is not different from the principle which loves."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme 315: «[E]t avoir du plaisir ou de la douleur, c'est, pour la moyenne sensible, agir à l'égard du bien ou du mal, en tant que les choses sont l'un ou l'autre. La haine en acte pour l'un, et le désir en acte pour l'autre, ne sont que la douleur et le plaisir; le principe qui, dans l'âme, désire, et celui qui hait, ne sont pas différents entre eux, pas plus qu'ils ne le sont du principe qui sent; la façon d'être est seule diverse.»

On the Soul 3, 7, 431a10-14: "To feel pleasure or pain is to act with the sensitive mean towards what is good or bad as such. Both avoidance and appetite when actual are identical with this: the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not different, either from one another or from the faculty of sense-perception; although their manner of being is different."

De Anima III, vii, 431a10-14: καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦτο ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὔτ᾽ ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο.

Joyce is somewhat misled by the French translation; the words "*orektikon*" and "*pheuktikon*" should be translated as "attraction" and "aversion", rather than "love" and "hate". Aristotle's statement concerns neither cosmic origins or metaphysical

principles of love or hate, nor the moral dilemma of odium or devotion, but rather the spontaneous response of pleasure and pain which naturally accompanies simple sensation; instead of love or hate, it is more accurate to speak of appeal and repulsion, appetite and avoidance. Aristotle's point is that not only do we seek or avoid objects in virtue of the same capacity, but that this response is rooted in sensation itself. Aquinas suggests a reason for this clarification: "He says this in opposition to Plato, who located the organ of appetitive capacity in one part of the body and the organ of the sensory capacity in another."[50] I have been unable to identify any allusion to this quotation in Joyce's work.

Quotation 13: "The intellect conceives the forms of the images presented to it."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme 317-18: «Ainsi donc, l'âme intelligente pense les formes dans les images qu'elle perçoit.»

On the Soul 3, 7, 431b2: "The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images."[51]

De Anima III, vii, 431b2: τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ.

This is a basic doctrine of Aristotle's theory of the soul, and his interpretation of how knowledge operates. The mind cannot think without recourse to images or phantasms. Joyce's reading of the passage is not quite complete; it is not enough to state that the intellect conceives the forms of the images presented to it: the fact is that without images, the intellect cannot think at all.

The lines immediately following Quotation 12 are very similar to the text quoted here: "For the intellective soul, images are like sense objects … hence the soul never thinks without images." (*On the Soul* 3, 7, 431a14-17. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire's translation: «Quant à l'âme intelligente, les images remplissent pour elle le rôle des sensations.… Voilà pourquoi cette âme ne pense jamais sans images.»).

I have not been able to identify any passage which bears resemblance to this quotation. The nature and function of the imagination, and its role in artistic creation, were of great interest to Joyce. He was from early on intrigued by the working of the mind. He wrote to Ezra Pound: "The scholastic machinery of the process of thought is very intricate, verbum mentale and the rest of it … These philosophical terms are such tricky bombs that I am shy of handling them, being afraid they may go off in my hands."[52]

Quotation 14: "The intellectual soul is the form of forms." (*On the Soul* 3, 8, 432a2).

Quotation 15: "The soul is in a manner all that is." (*On the Soul* 3, 8, 431b21)

Both of these quotations are from the same paragraph although Joyce reverses the order in which they occur. It will be helpful to cite the passage in full, adding emphasis to the phrases used by Joyce.

Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme, 320-322: «Maintenant, en récapitulant ce qui a été dit de l'âme, nous répéterons que ***l'âme est en quelque sorte toutes les choses qui sont***. En effet, les choses sont ou sensibles ou intelligibles, et la science est en quelque façon les choses qu'elle sait, de même que la sensation est les choses sensibles. Comment cela est-il possible, c'est ce qu'il faut rechercher,

et le voici: la science et la sensation sont divisées, selon les choses mêmes qu'elles embrassent: celle qui est en puissance, selon les choses en puissance; celle qui est en toute réalité, en entéléchie, selon les choses en entéléchie. Le principe qui sent et le principe qui sait dans l'âme sont en puissance les objets mêmes: ici, l'objet qui est su, et là, l'objet qui est senti. Mais nécessairement, ou il s'agit ici des objets eux-mêmes, ou seulement de leurs formes; et ce ne sont certainement pas les objets; car ce n'est pas la pierre qui est dans l'âme, c'est seulement sa forme. Ainsi donc, l'âme est comme la main: si la main est l'instrument des instruments, ***l'intelligence est la forme des formes***; et la sensation est la forme des choses sensibles.»

On the Soul 3, 8, 431b20-432a2: "Now summarizing what we have said about the soul, let us repeat that **the soul is in a manner all that is**. The things which exist are either sensible or intelligible; knowledge is in a way what is knowable, and sensation in a way the sensible—how this is so, we must inquire. Knowledge and sensation are divided according to their objects: potential knowledge to what is potential, actual knowledge to what is actual. The sensible and the cognitive faculties of the soul are potentially these objects: the one cognitively, the other sensibly. They must be either these things themselves, or their forms; but they are not the things themselves, since the stone does not exist in the soul, but rather its form. The soul is thus like the hand; for as the hand is the instrument of instruments, so **the intellect is the form of forms**, and sensation the form of sensible objects."[53]

De Anima III, viii, 431b20-432a2: νῦν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα ... ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χείρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν.

Both quotations are to be found in "Nestor", in a paragraph which is replete with Aristotelian allusion, and to which we will return: "The soul is in a manner all that is: the soul is the form of forms. Tranquillity sudden, vast, candescent: form of forms" (*U* 2.75, See Quotation 28 below). In "Proteus" this double allusion is repeated: "Take all, keep all. My soul walks with me, form of forms" (*U* 3.79-80). And in "Scylla and Charydis" Stephen enlists Aristotle to resolve the problem of personal identity: "But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under everchanging forms" (*U* 9.208-9. See commentary on Quotation 1 above).

Quotation 16: "Colour is the limit of the diaphane in any determined body."

Psychologie d'Aristote. Opuscules, De la sensation et des choses sensibles (J. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire), p. 39f: «Mais comme la couleur est dans une limite, elle doit être aussi à la limite du diaphane; et par conséquent, on pourrait définir la couleur: la limite du diaphane dans un corps déterminé.» ***On Sense and Sensible Objects*** 3, 439b10-12: "But since the colour is at the extremity of the body, it must be at the extremity of the transparent in the body. Whence it follows that we may define colour as the limit of the transparent in a determinately bounded body."[54]

De Sensu III, 439b11-12: ὥστε χρῶμα ἂν εἴη τὸ τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐν σώματι ὡρισμένῳ πέρας.

Joyce was fascinated by the perceptive process through which we are receptive to the "epiphanies" of the world. Implicit in his language is both a metaphysic and a metaphoric of light. "Diaphane", the Greek word for "translucent" or "transparent", seems to have held special allure for him. According to Aristotle,

light is incidentally described as the colour of that which is transparent: the presence of something fiery in a translucent body constitutes light; its absence is darkness. We normally associate transparence with water and air; it can potentially, however, be present in all bodies to a greater or lesser extent. It is colour which constitutes this limit or extent, placing boundaries upon translucence. Colour thus coincides with the boundaries of a body which has its own determinate limits.

The Aristotelian interpretation of colour and perception is evident in the opening lines of "Proteus", which are worth citing: "Signatures of all things I am here to read, seaspawn and seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot. Snotgreen, bluesilver, rust: coloured signs. Limits of the diaphane. But he adds: in bodies. Then he was aware of them bodies before of them coloured. How? By knocking his sconce against them, sure. Go easy. Bald he was and a millionaire, *maestro di color che sanno*. Limit of the diaphane in. Why in? Diaphane, adiaphane. If you can put your five fingers through it, it is a gate, if not a door. Shut your eyes and see. (*U* 3.3-9).

Quotation 17: "Nature always acts in the view of some end."

Quotation 18: "The end of every being is its greatest good."

Both quotations derive from the same paragraph of Aristotle's work *On Sleep*. Aubert gives a correct reference to Aristotle, but cites as Joyce's French source a paraphrase from the "plan du traité" (p. 140): "La nature fait toujours toutes choses en vue de quelque fin." Joyce's version corresponds more accurately to the phrase in the treatise itself. I will cite the paragraph in its entirety, since it conveniently outlines Aristotle's theory of the four causes, depicted graphically in Joyce's notebook. (See below, p. 33).

Psychologie d'Aristote. Opuscules, Du sommeil et de la veille (J. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire), 156f: «Il faut expliquer maintenant la cause qui détermine le sommeil, et la nature de cette affection. Mais, d'abord, on distingue plusieurs espèces de causes. Ainsi, la fin en vue de laquelle se fait une chose, puis le principe d'où part le mouvement, en troisième lieu, la matière, et enfin l'essence, sont pour nous autant de causes distinctes. Nous disons donc d'abord que **la nature agit toujours en vue de quelque fin**, et que cette fin est toujours un bien. Mais pour tout ce qui a naturellement un mouvement, sans d'ailleurs pouvoir conserver ce mouvement toujours et continuellement, le repos est nécessairement agréable et utile; et c'est avec toute vérité que l'on applique cette métaphore au sommeil qu'on regarde comme un repos et un délassement. Par conséquent, le sommeil est donné aux animaux en vue de leur conservation. Mais la fin en vue de laquelle le sommeil a lieu, c'est la veille; car sentir et penser est la fin véritable de tous les êtres qui ont l'une ou l'autre de ces facultés, parce qu'elles sont leur plus grand bien, et que **la fin de chaque être est toujours son bien le plus grand**. Ainsi il faut nécessairement que la fonction du sommeil appartienne à tout animal sans exception.»

On Sleep and Waking 2, 455b13-26: "We have next to consider the cause of sleep, and what sort of affection it is. Now there are several causes—we recognise as such the final, the efficient, the material and the formal cause. First of all then, since we hold that **nature acts with some end in view** and that this end is a good, and that to everything which naturally moves, but cannot with pleasure move always and continuously, rest is necessary and beneficial; and since sleep is accurately called "rest" by metaphor: it follows that the object of sleep is to preserve animal life. But its goal is the waking state; for perception or thinking is the proper end of all creatures which have either of these capacities, inasmuch as these are best, and **the end is what is best**. Hence sleep belongs necessarily to every animal."[55]

De Somno II, 455b17: λέγομεν τὴν φύσιν ἕνεκά του ποιεῖν.

De Somno II, 455b24-25: τὸ δὲ τέλος βέλτιστον.

Both quotations surface in *Stephen Hero*, spoken by Cranly: "Most people have some purpose or other in their lives. Aristotle says that the end of every being is its greatest good. We all act in view of some good" (*SH* 220).

As a convinced Aristotelian, Joyce perhaps recognised the fundamental importance of Aristotle's teleology, and his unbending optimism in the goodness of nature. It is a fundamental evidence for Aristotle that "Nature does nothing in vain, but always does the best possible for the substance of each kind of animal; therefore, if one way is better than another, this is also the way of nature."[56] He repeats in a variety of formulations this attitude which imbues his entire approach in biology and philosophy.[57]

Quotation 19: "Speculation is above practice."

Métaphysique d'Aristote (J. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire) I, 11f.: «[D]ans l'opinion de tout le monde, la science que l'on décore du nom de Sagesse, la Philosophie, a pour objet les causes et les principes des choses. Je le répète donc, en résumant ce qui précède: l'expérience, à ce qu'il semble, est un degré de science plus relevé que la sensation, sous quelque forme que la sensation s'exerce; l'homme qui se guide par les données de l'art est supérieur à ceux qui suivent exclusivement l'expérience; l'architecte est au-dessus des manoeuvres; et **les sciences de théorie sont au-dessus des sciences purement pratiques**.»

De la Métaphysique d'Aristote (Victor Cousin), 125f.: «[L]'expérience est supérieure à la sensation, l'art à l'expérience, l'architecte au manœuvre et la théorie à la pratique.»

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Metaphysics 1, 1, 981b28-982a3: "It is presumed by everyone that what is called "wisdom" is concerned with primary causes and principles; so that, as has been already stated, the man of experience seems wiser than one who simply has sensations, the artist is wiser than the man of experience, the master craftsman than the artisan; and **the theoretical sciences than the productive sciences**. It is clear that wisdom is a knowledge of certain principles and causes."

Metaphysics I, i, 981b28-982a3: τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες· ὥστε καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὁ μὲν ἔμπειρος τῶν ὁποιανοῦν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐμπείρων, χειροτέχνου δὲ ἀρχιτέκτων, **αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν μᾶλλον.** ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ σοφία περί τινας ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη δῆλον.

This quotation summarises Aristotle's position regarding the superior value of the speculative inquiry of philosophy which seeks wisdom for its own sake without any practical motivation. His *Metaphysics* begins with the assertion that "All men by nature desire to know", and proceeds to explain that this desire reaches its highest expression in the speculative inquiry into the most fundamental causes and principles of all things. It is possible that, rather than rendering here a single phrase (which does not entirely correspond), Joyce is summarising Aristotle's general attitude which is more clearly stated in the following paragraph: "That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophise; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon

and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophised in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. And this is confirmed by the facts; for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation were present, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for itself."[58]

There is a clear reference to *Metaphysics* I in Joyce's review of Lady Gregory's *Poets and Dreamers*, published shortly after he had written to his mother that he was "up to his neck" in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[59] The merits of speculation over practice are clear: "Aristotle finds at the beginning of all speculation the feeling of wonder, a feeling proper to childhood, and if speculation be proper to the middle period of life it is natural that one should look to the crowning period of life for the fruit of speculation, wisdom itself."[60]

Quotation 20: "The wood does not make the bed nor the bronze the statue."

Métaphysique d'Aristote I, 33 : «Ce n'est pas le bois apparemment qui fait le lit; ce n'est pas l'airain qui fait la statue.»[61]

Metaphysics 1, 3, 984a24-25: "The wood does not make a bed, nor the bronze a statue."

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Metaphysics I, iii, 984a24-25: οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύλον κλίνην ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς ἀνδριάντα.

According to Aristotle, scientific knowledge is knowledge through causes; an individual is only known when its causes are disclosed. (Unexpectedly, perhaps, it is Bloom who declares: "Every phenomenon has a natural cause.") (*U* 15.2795-6). In this quotation, Aristotle refers to the need for an efficient cause in order to explain how an individual comes to be. Matter or the material cause is insufficient of itself to explain the process whereby a living substance or artefact originates; it requires the action of an agent cause, which determines it according to a definite form. Joyce was familiar with Aristotle's famous theory of the four causes: material, efficient, formal, and final. In his Paris notebook Joyce depicted their relationship by means of the cruciform sketch reproduced opposite. At the centre stands the imagined individual (substance or artefact). The arrow indicates the action of the agent-cause upon the matter which, for its part, stands in a binary, intrinsic, co-relationship *vis-à-vis* the form (formal cause); the efficient cause acts through an impetus directed towards the final cause—the ultimate explanation and reference point for the individual in its totality. Joyce could read the Latin terms for the four causes in footnotes to Cousin's translation (p. 132): *causa formalis* (identified by Cousin as "la *quidditas* des scholastiques"), *causa materialis*, *causa efficiens*, and *causa finalis*.

In *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce refers obliquely—to say the least!—to Aristotle's four causes: "Gives there not too amongst us after all events (or so grunts a leading hebdromadary) some togethergush of stillandbutallyouknow that, insofarforth as, all up and down the whole concreation say, **efficient** first gets there **finally** every time, as a complex **matter** of pure **form**…" (*FW* 581).



Diagram of Aristotle's four causes, page 11 of Joyce's notebook

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Quotation 21. "One who has only opinion is, compared with one who knows, in a state of sickness with regard to truth."

Métaphysique d'Aristote II, 49: «En effet, comparativement à l'homme qui sait les choses, celui qui ne s'en forme qu'une vague opinion n'est pas dans une santé parfaite par rapport à la vérité.»

Metaphysics 4, 4, 1008b30-31: "By contrast with someone who knows, the one who has mere opinion is not in a healthy disposition towards the truth."

Metaphysics IV, iv, 1008b30-31: καὶ γὰρ ὁ δοξάζων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιστάμενον οὐχ ὑγιεινῶς διάκειται πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

I am unaware of any allusion to this quotation. Quotations 21, 22, 23, 24, and 26 share a common motif and indicate a fundamental Aristotelian attitude which is characteristic of Joyce's mind—his belief in the objectivity and reliable nature of knowledge. Concerning his brother's passing curiosity in Pragmatism, Stanislaus commented: "The asserted relativity of truth and the practical test of knowledge by its usefulness to an end ran counter not only to his Aristotelian principles of logic, but still more to his character."[62]

The contrast between truth and opinion, presented by Aristotle as a value distinction, may be mirrored by the juxtaposition of the following statements from *Stephen Hero*: "It is a mark of the modern spirit to be shy in the presence of all absolute statements. However sure you may be now of the reasonableness of your convictions you cannot be sure that you will always think them reasonable" (*SH* 205); "He was persuaded that no-one served the generation into which he had been born so well as he who offered it, whether in his art or in his life, the gift of certitude" (*SH* 76).

In a review of Ibsen's *Catalina*, published in March 1903, the time he was studying Aristotle intensely, Joyce charged art with the task of counteracting the relativism of his day and appealed to Aristotle's use of character as a possible model. He wrote: "As the breaking-up of tradition, which is the work of the modern era, discountenances the absolute, and as no writer can escape the spirit of his time, the writer of dramas must remember now more than ever a principle of all patient and perfect art which bids him express his fable in terms of his characters."[63]

Quotation 22: "The same attribute cannot at the same time and in the same connection belong and not belong to the same subject."

Métaphysique d'Aristote II, 25: «Il est impossible qu'une seule et même chose soit, et tout à la fois ne soit pas, à une même autre chose, sous un même rapport.»

Metaphysics 4, 3, 1005b19-20: "The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect."[64]

Metaphysics IV, iii, 1005b19-20: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό.

In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* Stephen explains: "Aristotle's entire system of philosophy rests upon his book of psychology and that, I think, rests on his statement that the same attribute cannot at the same time and in the same connection belong and not belong to the same subject" (*P* 208). Stephen is mistaken regarding the location of Aristotle's formulation—perhaps this is intentional on Joyce's part. It is in the *Metaphysics* that Aristotle seeks an absolute, necessary, non-hypothetical principle which would guarantee all others. Such a principle must be immediately evident and compelling to anyone who thinks, admitting of no exceptions. Thus he formulated the famous law of non-contradiction. Stephen is clearly struck by the luminosity of this fundamental law governing all thought and pervading all reality: insofar as something is, it cannot not-be; insofar as we affirm, we cannot simulaneously deny. It is rigorous and compelling; it is absolute. According to Aristotle, whoever denies it reduces himself to the status of the plant.

Joyce's rendition of the principle differs noticeably from the French translation. We can be certain however that, having taken Logic as a second year subject at University College, Dublin, he was already familiar with this fundamental law of thought. It is interesting to note in passing that Stanislaus Joyce invokes the evidence of the principle of non-contradiction when scorning the idea of

belief in mystery: "One would laugh at the ridiculous idea of Aristotle covering his face with his hands and praying to God in agony of spirit to remove the temptation to disbelieve in the principle that at the same time and in the same connection the same attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same object."[65]

The principle of non-contradiction is changed almost beyond recognition in *Finnegans Wake* (a most unAristotelian work!): "…dime *is* cash and the cash system (you must not be allowed to forget that this is all contained, I mean the systems in the dogmarks of origen on spurios) means that I cannot now have or nothave a piece of cheeps in your pocket at the same time and with the same manners as you can now nothalf or half the cheek apiece I've in mind unless Burrus and Caseous have not or not have seemaultaneously sysentangled themselves, selldear to soldthere, once in the dairy days of buy and buy" (*FW* 161).

Quotation 23: "There cannot be a middle term between two contrary propositions."

Métaphysique d'Aristote II, 73: «Il n'est pas possible davantage qu'entre deux propositions contradictoires, il y ait jamais un terme moyen; mais il y a nécessité absolue, ou d'affirmer, ou de nier une chose d'une chose.»[66]

Metaphysics 4, 7, 1011b23-24: "Moreover there cannot be an intermediate between contradictory propositions, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate, whatever it may be."

Metaphysics IV, vii, 1011b24-25: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι οὐθέν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἓν καθ' ἑνὸς ὁτιοῦν.

This is the principle of excluded middle, the complement to the principle of non-contradiction. Together with the principle of identity, they are the fundamental laws of thought which govern all reasoning. In translating this passage, Joyce confuses "contrary" with "contradictory", which makes the statement invalid. "Yellow", for example, is a contrary of "black", but not its contradictory (which is "non-black"); it is possible to have intermediate statements between contrary statements, but not between contradictory statements. There is an allusion to the laws of thought in *Portrait*: "If you mean speculation, sir, said Stephen, I also am sure that there is no such thing as free thinking inasmuch as all thinking must be bound by its own laws." After the dean's exclamatory "Ha!", Stephen continues: "For my purpose I can work on at present by the light of one or two ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas." (*P* 187).

Quotation 24: "Necessity is that in virtue of which it is impossible that a thing should be otherwise."

Métaphysique d'Aristote II, 109f: «Quand une chose ne peut pas être autrement qu'elle n'est, nous déclarons qu'il est nécessaire qu'elle soit ce qu'elle est; et, à dire vrai, c'est d'après le Nécessaire pris en ce sens qu'on qualifie tout le reste de nécessaire.»

Metaphysics 5, 5, 1015a33-36: "We say that what cannot be otherwise, is necessarily as it is; and all other kinds of necessary are affirmed according to this meaning of necessary."

Metaphysics V, v, 1015a33-36: ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖόν φαμεν οὕτως ἔχειν· καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τἆλλα λέγεταί πως ἅπαντα ἀναγκαῖα.

Joyce's rendition captures admirably and accurately the essence of Arisotle's meaning. His quotation appears almost verbatim in "Scylla and Charybdis": "Stephen looked down on a wide headless caubeen, hung on his ashplanthandle over his knee. My casque and sword. Touch lightly with two index fingers. Aristotle's experiment. One or two? Necessity is that in virtue of which it is impossible that one can be otherwise. Argal, one hat is one hat" (*U* 9.295-299).

Joyce's quotation is taken from *Metaphysics* 5, a lexicon of philosophical terms, in which Aristotle provides a comprehensive survey of the various kinds of "necessity".[67] There is the hypothetical necessity of a condition needed for an effect to occur; the—unnatural—necessity of violence or compulsion; the logical necessity proper to demonstration; and the absolute necessity of that which cannot be otherwise than it is: this is the primary meaning of necessity, implicit in all of the others. These are, in Aristotle's terms, the "ineluctable modalities" of the world.

The so-called "experiment" refers to an intriguing tactile illusion noted by Aristotle in his book of *Problems*: "Why is it that an object which is held between two crossed fingers appears to be two? Is it because we touch it with two sense-organs? For when we hold the hand in its natural position we cannot touch it with the outer sides of the two fingers."[68]

Quotation 25: "The hand is not (absolutely) part of the body."

Métaphysique d'Aristote II, 327f.: «Ainsi, la main, absolument parlant, n'est pas une partie de l'homme; elle est uniquement la main tant qu'elle est animé, et qu'elle peut remplir la fonction qui lui est propre; si elle n'est pas animée et vivante, ce n'est plus une partie de l'homme.»

Metaphysics 7, 11, 1036b30-32: "For it is not the hand in any condition which is a part of man, but only when it can fulfil its function, and so is alive; without life, it is not a part."

Metaphysics VII, xi, 1036b30-32: οὐ γὰρ πάντως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἡ χείρ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ δυναμένη τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν, ὥστε ἔμψυχος οὖσα· μὴ ἔμψυχος δὲ οὐ μέρος.

This statement occurs in *Metaphysics* 7, where Aristotle—in a notoriously difficult series of discussions—seeks to identify the basic principle of substance: what is it that accounts for the "beingness" of something? Concluding that it is to be identified primarily as form (*eidos*), he emphasises that in the case of living things, this cannot exist apart from their material parts. Saint-Hilaire's phrase "absolutely speaking" does not clearly transmit the sense of the original. Jacques Aubert has identified an allusion to this quotation in the following passage from *Portrait*: "He was in mortal sin. Even once was a mortal sin. It could happen in an instant. But how so quickly? By seeing or by thinking of seeing. The eyes see the thing, without having wished first to see. Then in an instant it happens. But does that part of the body understand or what?" (*P* 139).

Quotation 26: "It is in beings that are always the same and are not susceptible of change that we must seek for truth."

Métaphysique d'Aristote III, 101: «On ne doit chercher à trouver la vérité que dans les choses qui sont éternellement les mêmes, et qui ne subissent jamais le moindre changement.»

Metaphysics 11, 6, 1063a13-15: "We should pursue truth with reference to those things which are always the same, and which undergo no change."

Metaphysics XI, vi, 1063a13-15: δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων καὶ μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν ποιουμένων τἀληθὲς θηρεύειν.

This quotation is one of those which indicate Joyce's interest in affirming the stability of knowledge; it is closely related to Quotation 24, which defines necessity. Against Parmenides, Aristotle accepted the evidence of change, yet maintained that the object of knowledge requires a measure of necessity or permanence;[69] against Plato, he believed that it is possible to attain stable knowledge about changing realities. There is a limited element of necessity even in mutable, sensible, things which allows them to be known scientifically, but this must ultimately be traced back to eternal beings, which are utterly necessary and cannot be otherwise than as they are. As well as the Prime Mover, according to Aristotle, the heavenly bodies are also necessary and eternal.

Quotation 27: "Movement is the actuality of the possible as possible."
Métaphysique d'Aristote III, 120f: «L'Être se divisant dans chacun de ses genres, ici en puissance, et là en acte parfait, en Entéléchie, j'appelle mouvement l'acte du possible en tant que possible.»[70]

Metaphysics 11, 9, 1065b14-16: "Since every kind of reality is divided into the potential and the actual (*entelecheia*), I call movement the actualisation of the potential as such."

Metaphysics XI, ix, 1065b16: τὴν τοῦ δυνάμει ᾗ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνέργειαν λέγω κίνησιν.

This phrase occurs verbatim in Stephen's reflection upon history in "Nestor": "It must be a movement then, an actuality of the possible as possible. Aristotle's

phrase formed itself within the gabbled verses and floated out into the studious silence of the library of Sainte Genevieve where he had read, sheltered from the sin of Paris, night by night." Joyce's translation of Aristotle is itself garbled, due to an error in the French version: Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire's translation was described by J. Tricot, whose own translation was published in 1940, as a "*traduction très défectueuese*".[71] Aristotle defines motion or change as the actuality, or actualisation, not of the "*possible as the possible*", but of the "*potential as potential*". The correct word in French would be "*potentialité*" or "*puissance*".

Is this not mere semantics? Indeed, but there is literally a world of difference between the "potential" and the "possible". Anything which is potential must also be possible; however, not everything which is in any sense possible is thereby potentially real. Philosophers have distinguished between logical and metaphysical possibility, also called objective and subjective possibility. Objective possibility is what is logically possible, insofar as it contains no contradiction. Subjective possibility is what has within itself the potential to be realised. The notion of a railway line to Saturn involves no inherent contradiction and is in that sense logically possible; strange as it may sound, it is "objectively possible". Subjectively, however, there are no individual existing entities which have intrinsically within themselves the wherewithal required to make it an actual reality. It has no potency in reality.

What difference could this apparently simple difference between "potency" and "possibility" have made to the composition of *Ulysses?* What are the consequences

of the fact that Joyce was misled with regard to one of the most fundamental doctrines of Aristotle's metaphysics? Perhaps none, other than a change of word which re-occurs throughout the book. The phrase "actuality of the potential as the potential", it must be said, does not have the same flowing cadence; perhaps the error is *bien trouvé*.

In "Scylla and Charybdis" Stephen reflects upon the imponderable reality of unfulfilled contingencies of the past, and the status of unrealised possiblities: "Here he ponders things that were not: what Caesar would have lived to do had he believed the soothsayer: what might have been: possibilities of the possible as possible: things not known: what name Achilles bore when he lived among women" (*U* 9.348-351).

Quotation 28: "Thought is the thought of thought."

De la Métaphysique d'Aristote (Victor Cousin), 214: «Dieu donc se pense lui-même, s'il est ce qu'il y a de plus puissant, et sa pensée est la pensée de la pensée.»

Metaphysics 12, 9, 1074b33-35: "Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks, since it is the most excellent of things, and its thinking is a thinking of thinking."[72]

Metaphysics XII, ix, 1074b33-35: αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.[73]

This phrase occurs in a paragraph of "Nestor" which is dense with Aristotelian allusion and association. Having theorised about history in the light of Aristotle's metaphysics, Stephen reflects upon knowledge, thought and the soul, inspired both by Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *De Anima*: "Thought is the thought of thought. Tranquil brightness. The soul is in a manner all that is: the soul is the form of forms. Tranquillity sudden, vast, candescent: form of forms" (*U* 2.74-6). Joyce draws from his treasury of quotations, taking licence, however, in fusing—if not confusing—aspects of Aristotle's psychology with his

metaphysics and theology. As we have seen, the soul is for Aristotle the "form of forms", because it uniquely has the power to assimilate in an immaterial mode the essences or forms of everything it knows. God is defined by Aristotle as self-thinking thought, or the "thought of thought". Thinking is the highest act of which man is capable, and therefore the best activity that we can ascribe to the Prime Mover. Now the only proper object of God's thinking can be God himself, i.e. the being whose nature is itself the plenitude of thought—hence the definition of God as *noesis noeseos*, self-thinking thought.

It is possible that Joyce's reading of this passage was influenced by the following passage from Victor Cousin's book on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: «Ce n'est pas la virtualité de la pensée, mais sa manifestation active qui fait sa beauté et son caractère divin. De là, cette formule d'Aristote: la vraie pensée est la pensée de la pensée, ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοησέως νόησις.»[74]

There is an audible echo of this quotation in Bloom's musings on the advantages of shaving: "With thought of aught he sought though fraught with nought" (*U* 17.284-5).

Quotation 29: "God is the eternal perfect animal."

De la Métaphysique d'Aristote (Victor Cousin), 200f: «Aussi nous disons que Dieu est un animal éternel et parfait.»

Metaphysics 12, 7, 1072b28-29: "We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good."[75]

Metaphysics XII, vii, 1072b28-29: φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον.

This statement might be seen as the logical finale to those quotations from Aristotle cited by Joyce in response to what he viewed as the shyness of the modern era which "discountenances the absolute". I am not familiar with any reference by Joyce in his creative works to this line from Aristotle.

Joyce's cousin, Kathleen Murray, recalled a conversation he had with his aunt Josephine: "I remember him saying that he envied her faith. "Do you believe in a Supreme Being?" she once asked. 'Yes,' he answered, and she left it at that."[76] Aristotle's eternal, perfect, God was perhaps the object of his belief.

Quotation 30: "The object of desire is that which appears to us *beautiful*… We desire a thing because it appears to us *good* (?)"

De la Métaphysique d'Aristote (Cousin), 197: «**En effet, l'objet du désir est ce qui paraît beau**; et l'objet premier de la volonté est le bien lui-même; car **nous désirons une chose parce que nous la jugeons bonne**, plutôt que nous la jugeons telle parce que nous la désirons.»

Métaphysique d'Aristote (J. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire), III, 181f. : «L'objet désiré est ce que nous paraît être bien; et le primitif de la volonté, c'est le bien même. Nous le souhaitons, parce qu'il nous paraît souhaitable, bien plutôt qu'il ne nous paraît souhaitable parce que nous le souhaitons.»

Metaphysics 12, 7, 1072a27-29: "The primary objects of desire and thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the object of the will. Desire is the result of opinion rather than opinion that of desire."[77]

Metaphysics XII, vii, 1072a27-29: ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν ... ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα.

Joyce follows Cousin's translation. Aristotle is here concerned with the distinction between what *appears* to be good or beautiful, and moves the appetite; and that which is *really* beautiful, and motivates the rational will. Cousin's translation perhaps suggests that the distinction in question is between the good and the beautiful; Aristotle, however, refers only to the beautiful (τὸ καλόν). Joyce's question mark indicates that he is unsure of the sense of the passage. He translates this uncertainty into one of the questions written in another section of his notebook: "I desire to see the Mona Lisa. Is it therefore beautiful or is it good?" While Joyce's question is understandable in light of the translation, it is not Aristotle's intention here to distinguish between good and beauty, but rather between the distinct value which something has for the appetite and the will.

Quotation 31. "Nature, it seems, is not a collection of unconnected episodes, like a bad tragedy."

Métaphysique d'Aristote III, 355: «Cependant, d'après tout ce que nous voyons, la nature ne montre pas à nos yeux une succession de vains épisodes, comme on en trouve dans une mauvaise tragédie.»[78]

Metaphysics **14, 3, 1090b19-20**: "From what we observe it does not appear that nature is a series of episodes, like a bad tragedy."

Metaphysics **XIV, iii, 1090b19-20**: οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγῳδία.

This passage is more than likely behind Stephen's reference to "The playwright who wrote the folio of this world and wrote it badly" (*U* 9.1046-7). For Aristotle the universe was a "cosmos" in its original sense of an ordered unity. Herbert Gorman remarked: "There is an Aristotelean leaning toward the unities in Joyce."[79] Ellmann also recognised this when he wrote: "*Ulysses* may be

seen to conduct its affirmation by discovery of kinship among disparate things, whether these are mind and body, casual and important, contemporary and Homeric, or Bloom and Stephen. The universe is, if nothing else, irrevocably interpenetrating."[80] Aristotle's sense of the universal interconnectedness of the universe, of unity amid diversity, is also conveyed in the following statement by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 12: "All things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike—both fishes and fowl and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are all connected. For all are ordered together to one end."[81]

It would appear that Joyce was aware of Aristotle's emphasis upon analogy as the principle of order allowing diversity and unity to be articulated, and that he adopted it as a principle of organisation for *Ulysses*. He wrote: "It is also a kind of encyclopaedia. My intention is not only to render the myth *sub specie temporis nostri* but also to allow each adventure (that is, every hour, every organ, every art being interconnected and interrelated in the somatic scheme of the whole) to condition and even to create its own technique."[82] This appreciation of analogy is one of the most profound affinities between Aristotle and James Joyce. Both would eagerly agree, I expect, with the words of a modern critic: "Analogy—likeness between dissimilar things—holds within itself the very secret of the universe."[83]

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ENDNOTES

[1] Regarding the provenance of this large collection of previously unknown manuscripts, see Peter Kenny, "The Joyce Papers 2002", p. 4: "The materials acquired by the Library were the property of Mr and Mrs Alexis Léon, and were acquired through the agency of Sotheby's, London. Mr Léon's parents, the late Paul and Lucie Léon, were close friends of Joyce from 1928 onwards. Mr and Mrs Alexis Léon decided that the National Library of Ireland should be given first refusal on the new collection because they hoped it would thus come to the Library to which Mr Léon's father had donated the extensive collection of James Joyce–Paul Léon letters in 1941."

[2] A description of the notebook may be found on the National Library of Ireland website, "The Joyce Papers 2002", p. 9: "*School exercise book for mathematics. Red-brown cover with black tape binding along outer spine. With printed cover title*: "L'ÉTUDIANT | {laurel wreath} | Papeterie-Imprimerie F. BÉNARD | 10, Galerie de l'Odéon, 10 | Maison principale: 16, Rue de Vaugirard". *31 numbered pages; 10 unnumbered pages with text; blank page; small fragment remaining from removed page; 2 unnumbered pages with text; 38 blank pages {i.e. 82 pages + fragment}. 21.5 x 17* cm. *At head of front cover in MS*: "Priez de rendre à | James A. Joyce | Rue Corneille, | Paris."

[3] See Robert Scholes and Richard M. Kain. *The Workshop of Daedalus*, pp. 52, 80; Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann, eds. *The Critical Writings of James Joyce*, p. 143; William T. Noon, S.J., *Joyce and Aquinas*, p. 13.

[4] For a reproduction of page 8 of the notebook, neatly covered with sums and columns of receipts and expenses (in francs and £.s.d.), complete with a mock "seal" and Joyce's signature, see the photograph opposite p. 91 in Herbert Gorman, *James Joyce* (Farrar & Rinehart edition with photographs). The bottom line reads: "Remainder – 0".

[5] These are most conveniently reproduced in Jacques Aubert, *The Aesthetics of James Joyce*.

[6] Herbert Gorman only included a selection of the Aristotle quotations in his biography of Joyce. They were reproduced in full by Richard F. Peterson from Gorman's manuscript. See "More Aristotelian Grist for the Joycean Mill".

[7] Herbert Gorman, *James Joyce*, p. 90.

ENDNOTES

[8] *Letters* II, p. 28.

[9] *Letters* II, p. 38.

[10] *Portraits of the Artist in Exile*, ed. Willard Potts, p. 71.

[11] Stanislaus Joyce, *The Complete Dublin Diary of Stanislaus* Joyce, p. 53.

[12] "Peripatetic", from "peripateo" ("to walk about"), was the sobriquet given to Aristotle because of his practice of strolling around the Lyceum as he lectured.

[13] Don Gifford, *Ulysses Annotated*, p. 454.

[14] The Greek word "*entēles*" is derived from the word "*telos*", i.e. goal or end, and means "complete" or "full".

[15] *On the Soul* 2, 1, 412b5-6.

[16] *On the Soul* 3, 8, 432a2.

[17] *On the Soul* 3, 8, 431b20-21.

[18] Gorman, *James Joyce*, 94.

[19] Ellmann, op. cit., p. 120.

[20] Besides his excellent French translations of Joyce, Jacques Aubert has rendered inestimable service to scholars by his extensive research into the Aristotelian sources of Joyce. Without his book *The Aesthetics of James Joyce* this modest pamphlet would not have been possible. It is therefore with hesitation that I note minor shortcomings in Aubert's excellent study. These include some inaccurate quotations (referring occasionally to Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, but giving what appears to be his own translation), as well as a number of incorrect page and text references. Confusion is initially caused for the reader by the absence of numbers indicating which of the three volumes of *Métaphysique d'Aristote* is cited. It was doubtless the American publisher who "corrected" Joyce's spelling (e.g. "colour", "esthetic" and "judgment").

[21] Victor Cousin, *De la Métaphysique d'Aristote.* There is a copy in the Special Collection of University College Dublin, with an *Ex Libris* stamp of the Catholic University, University College, Dublin; it is unlikely, however, that Joyce consulted this translation as a student in Dublin. Of the 230 pages of this book, 100 are occupied by a translation of Books 1 and 12 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; the purpose of the publication was to present a report

on the theses presented for a competition to the Academy in Paris in 1835.

[22] I have changed Aubert's attribution of Quotation 27 from the *Physics* to the *Metaphysics*.

[23] The following are the works translated in that volume: *On Sense and Sensible Objects*, *On Memory and Recollection*, *On Sleep and Waking*, *On Dreams*, *On Divination in Sleep*, *On Movement of Animals*, *On Length and Shortness of Life*, *On Youth and Old Age*, *On Life and Death*, *On Respiration*.

[24] For a brief description of the contents of the notebook, see Peter Kenny, "The Joyce Papers 2002", p. 10.

[25] *Psychologie d'Aristote. Traité de l'âme*. Since with few exceptions Joyce uses Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire's translation, I only give his name with the first mention of a title. Victor Cousin is named each time his translation is quoted; for Quotations 19 and 30 I cite both translations.

[26] Aubert locates the source for this quotation at 412a27, which is entirely possible, since the content is the same; however, the French translation of the lines which I suggest corresponds perhaps more accurately to Joyce's rendition.

[27] *On the Soul* 2, 1, 414a12-14, my translation. For a comprehensive account, see *On the Soul* 2, 4, 415a14–415b28.

[28] *Parts of Animals* 1, 1, 640b33-35. Translation A. L. Peck, p. 67.

[29] *U* 15.105-7: "So that gesture, not music, not odours, would be a universal language, the gift of tongues rendering visible not the lay sense but the first entelechy, the structural rhythm."

[30] *Complete Works* II, p. 661.

[31] Stanislaus Joyce, *My Brother's Keeper*, p. 152.

[32] Cited by Ellmann, p. 204.

[33] Interview, quoted Ellmann, p. 204.

[34] *Letters* I, pp. 138f.

[35] Mary Lowe-Evans, *Crimes Against Fecundity. Joyce and Population Control*, p. 1.

[36] Op. cit., p. 9.

[37] *Dubliners*, 66f.

[38] Hélène Cixous, *The Exile of James Joyce*, p. 96f.

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[39] *Complete Works* I, p. 670.

[40] See John Burnet, *Aristotle on Education*, p. 116. Joyce's review is reprinted in *The Critical Writings*, pp. 109f.

[41] See *History of Animals* 1, 1, 15, 494b16-18: "Of man's senses, touch is the most accurate; taste is second; in the others, man is surpassed by a great number of animals" *Complete Works* I, p. 787. Also *Parts of Animals* 2, 16, 660a11-13: "Flesh is softer in man than in any other animal, the reason for this being that of all animals man has the most delicate sense of touch" *Complete Works* I, p. 1028. See also *Physiognomics* 3, 807b12-13.

[42] My translation.

[43] Aubert (132) incorrectly gives *On the Soul* 2, 11, 423b17, an earlier passage, as the source for this quotation.

[44] Thomas Aquinas, *A Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, p. 251.

[45] Ibid.

[46] An alternative explanation might be Joyce's memory, aurally internalised, that he took the bronze medal for singing, and missed the gold, at the 1904 Feis Cheoil.

[47] Aubert correctly cites Joyce's source in the French translation, but gives an incorrect reference for Aristotle's text and the Loeb English translation; *On the Soul* 3, 3, 428b18, translation, p. 163, refers to the "perception of proper objects" but omits the word "always". The translation of the correct text may be found on p. 157 of the Loeb edition.

[48] Robert McAlmon, "With James Joyce" in *James Joyce. Interviews and Recollections*, ed. E. H. Mikhail, pp. 104f.

[49] My translation, incorporating lines from the Loeb edition.

[50] Thomas Aquinas, *A Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, translated by Robert Pasnau, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, p. 382.

[51] *Complete Works* I, p. 686.

[52] Letters III, 166.

[53] My translation.

[54] *Complete Works* I, p. 698, slightly modified.

[55] Translation W. S. Hett, pp. 323-325, modified.

ENDNOTES

[56] *Progression of Animals* 2, 704b11-18. My translation.

[57] See Fran O'Rourke, "Aristotle and the Metaphysics of Evolution", pp. 18-21.

[58] *Metaphysics* I, 2, 982b11-28. *Complete Works* II, pp. 1554f.

[59] In his Introduction to *Aristotle on Education*, also reviewed by Joyce around this time, John Burnet brings out clearly the superiority of theoretical speculation over practical knowledge.

[60] *Critical Writings*, p. 103.

[61] Aubert (135) gives the correct page reference to Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire (without volume number), but instead of citing the latter's translation, appears to have provided his own translation of Joyce's phrase: "Le bois ne fait pas le lit, ni le bronze la statue." Joyce had also at his disposal the translation of Victor Cousin, but does not seem to have used his version: "[C]e n'est pas le sujet qui peut se changer lui-même; l'airain, par exemple, et le bois ne se changent pas eux-mêmes, et ne se font pas l'un statue, l'autre lit, mais il y a quelque autre cause à ce changement."

[62] Cited in *The Critical Writings*, p. 135, note 1.

[63] *Critical Writings*, p. 100. The editors add: "Here again Joyce shows his devotion to Aristotle's aesthetic." Referring to his study of Aristotle, Joyce wrote to Stanislaus on 8 February 1903: "If the editor of the 'Speaker' puts in my review of 'Catalina' you will see some of the fruits thereof" (*Letters* II, p. 28). Richard Ellmann comments: "Aristotle's *De Anima* is not mentioned in the review of *Catalina*, but some phrases are perhaps indebted to it. Joyce later used this work as the basis of much of the *Proteus* episode of *Ulysses*" (*Letters* II, p. 28, n. 2).

[64] *Complete Works* II, p. 1588.

[65] *The Complete Dublin Diary of Stanislaus Joyce*, p. 100.

[66] Aubert (135) gives the correct page reference to Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire's translation (without volume) but appears to have translated Joyce's quotation back into French: "Il ne peut y avoir de moyen terme entre deux propositions contraires."

[67] *Metaphysics* 5, 5, 1015a20-b15.

[68] *Problems* 35, 10, 965a36-39, *Complete Works* II, p. 1523.

ENDNOTES

[69] See *Nicomachean Ethics* 6, 6, 1140b31-32: "Scientific knowledge is a mode of conception dealing with universals and things that are of necessity." Translation H. Rackham.

[70] Aubert cites *Physics* 3, 1, 200.10-11 as Joyce's source for this quotation, intending presumably 201a10-11, which is entirely acceptable. However, since this phrase occurs between quotations from *Metaphysics* 11 and *Metaphysics* 12, it is reasonable to assume that Joyce took it from the same work. At *Métaphysique d'Aristote* III, 122, another, similar, version of the definition occurs: "La réalisation du possible en tant que possible, c'est le mouvement."

[71] J. Tricot. *Aristote. La Métaphysique* I, p. x. Tricot correctly translates the relevant passages: "Etant donné la distinction, en chaque genre, de ce qui est en puissance et de ce qui est en entéléchie, l'acte de ce qui est en puissance en tant que tel, je l'appelle mouvement." (*Métaphysique* 11, 9, 1065b16; II, p. 130); "c'est l'entéléchie de l'être en puissance, en tant qu'il est en puissance, qui constitue le mouvement" (*Métaphysique* 11, 9, 1065b33, pp. 131f). Barthélémy-Saint-Hilaire's many translations of Aristotle's writings are largely ignored in the scholarly literature on Aristotle.

[72] *Complete Works* II, p. 1698, modified.

[73] Aubert gives an incorrect location (XII, vii, 1072b20) for this phrase.

[74] Victor Cousin, *De la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, p. 69. See also pp. 90 and 97 for further citations of this phrase.

[75] *Complete Works* II, p. 1695.

[76] Patricia Hutchins, *James Joyce's World*, p. 86.

[77] Translation Hugh Tredennick, Loeb edition.

[78] Aubert gives an incorrect page reference (335).

[79] Herbert Gorman, *James Joyce. His First Forty Years*, p. 115.

[80] "*Ulysses:* A Short History", p. 719.

[81] *Metaphysics*, 12, 10, 1075a16-19. *Complete Works* II, p. 1699.

[82] *Selected Letters*, p. 271. I have adopted this translation over that printed in *Letters* I, pp. 146f.

[83] Caroline Spurgeon, *Shakespeare's Imagery and What It Tells Us*, p. 7.

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